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This report explores how residents of the Louisiana-Texas borderland defined and 
maintained the northeastern frontier of New Spain in the long eighteenth century. Utilizing 
colonial correspondence, royal decrees, and petitions, this study considers how subaltern 
historical actors—runaways, deserters, and foreigners—affected the geographic reality of 
Spanish sovereignty in the American Gulf Coast. Their movements across imperial borders 
illuminate the elusiveness of those borderlines and suggest alternate boundaries separating 
Spain’s American territory from that of her rivals. In their responses to royal 
questionnaires, soldiers garrisoned at the easternmost presidios of Los Adaes and 
Nacogdoches based their perceptions of New Spain’s geopolitical limits on the actions of 
border crossers. The actions of religious and political leaders, as well as the official 
protocol regarding runaway slaves and deserting soldiers, served as the evidence 
frontiersmen used to identify the location of the northern borderland. The tenuous status of 
the periphery led to flexibility in imperial control. Rather than enforce Spanish laws from 
the top-down, Texas officials relied on the knowledge and understanding of local dwellers 
to protect an ill-defined boundary in ways that both challenged royal law while maintaining 
distinct elements of colonial border control.  
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Introduction  
 Migrants have shaped the borders of Spanish territory in North America since the 
colonial period. When agents of New Spain met other European and Native powers in the 
Gulf Coast during the eighteenth century, they initiated the formation of new political 
boundaries and catalyzed the movement of illicit border crossers. Individuals seeking 
opportunity, liberty, and autonomy disregarded Spanish delimitations of sovereignty and 
traveled according to their own interests. Their actions produced alternative geographies 
of power. First located at the crossroads of empire along the Louisiana-Texas frontier, the 
alternate mappings informed the official location of the geopolitical divisions that 
distinguished New Spain from other governments.  
 This report adopts a “bottom-up” approach to explore the ways in which migrants 
shaped the geographic and juridical character of the Spanish northeastern borderland in the 
long eighteenth century. It focuses on the amorphous space between Texas and Louisiana 
in which peripheral members of competing empires interacted. It suggests first, that the 
location of the boundaries distinguishing these spaces was contingent on local actors and 
their memory of illicit border crossers. As individuals moved between Louisiana and Texas 
frontiers, they simultaneously blurred and reinforced popularly recognized borders in the 
minds of local observers. One result was that Spanish officials and frontier residents used 
migration patterns to determine the limits of New Spain. This essay also examines the 
productive potential of illicit migration itself. It analyzes how movement across this hazy 
margin influenced the actions of borderland inhabitants, sometimes more than edicts and 
decrees from the imperial center. Specifically, fugitive slaves who sought liberty in Spanish 
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Texas led officials, on both sides of the frontier, to bend laws, ignore superiors, and thus 
negotiate alternative terms of imperial limits at the local level. An exploration of these two 
points reveals how colonial border crossers participated in the making of the Spanish 
borderland.  
Before geopolitical boundaries separated the territories, rivalry between colonial 
projects sparked the European settlement of Texas and Louisiana. By 1714, the French had 
traveled down the Mississippi River and established Natchitoches as their southwestern-
most settlement (MAP 1). From Mexico City, officials of New Spain interpreted this 
intrusion as a threat to their domain and ordered the occupation of East Texas. Spanish 
authorities established five posts in the area. Amid the missions and military forts, Los 
Adaes figured as the eastern-most presidio, or garrison, located only thirteen miles west of 
French Natchitoches. These settlements were two of the farthest posts for either empire; 
they symbolized Spain and France’s claims to this distant territory. Yet the proximity of 
these communities to on another, along with their isolation from imperial metropoles, 
necessitated a century of collaborative survival along the frontier. Instead of strict borders, 
informal and flexible boundaries separated the two sites. Indeed, the location of a dividing 
line depended on whom you asked.  
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MAP 1 – Carte General de toute le Cote de la Louisianne jusqu'a la Baye St. Bernard, Alexandre De 
Batz (1747); French Map of Gulf Region; the Mississippi River is distinguishable in the center as well 
as the “Colorado River” (Red River) to the left of it. 
(http://www.texasbeyondhistory.net/adaes/maps.html) 
 
Following a brief historiography, the first chapter of this report explores how 
Adaesaños, or the inhabitants of Los Adaes, understood the border between Spanish and 
French empires in the Gulf region. Mobility emerged as a key factor in local understanding 
of the borderland. Priests, deserting soldiers, fugitive slaves, and foreigners, traveled across 
the frontier and in the process challenged the authority of recognized imperial limits. These 
factors played a telling role in how locals determined the limits of imperial power as non-
elite frontiersmen relied on memories of migrants and hearsay to reckon the borderline. 
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When mid-eighteenth-century investigations attempted to establish firm boundaries 
between the territories, officials could not easily determine satisfactory limits.  
Chapter two investigates how local conceptualizations of boundaries changed once 
Louisiana became a Spanish territory after the Seven Years War (1756-63). It focuses on 
the movement of Spanish and French subjects, as well as the response to them by Texas 
authorities. The transition altered the definition of “foreigners” for officials who 
subsequently reconsidered what type of migration they could permit. The possession of 
Louisiana also altered New Spain’s approach to native allies and introduced a large slave 
population to the kingdom’s purview. These regional changes transformed spatial 
understandings of liberty and opportunity at the local level.  
A final chapter examines Spanish slave asylum decrees and the debate to enforce 
them on the frontier. It explores how the mobility of fugitive slaves, after the Louisiana 
Purchase, affected the maintenance of the borderland. The increased presence of filibusters, 
adventurers, and traders in the Louisiana-Texas frontier motivated Spanish changes to 
territorial security. Exploring the ill-defined colonial boundaries of Texas reveals how 
individuals subverted imperial projects to maintain their own geographies of power. 
Historians must evaluate these differing constructions in order to understand the spatial 
frontiers of the early southwest of the southwest.  
Historiography  
The attempts of competing empires to define the limits of the Spanish borderland 
have remained contentious since the settlement of the Gulf Coast. Beyond early sporadic 
investigations, Father José Antonio Pichardo initiated the first major historical inquiry in 
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1805 that attempted to determine the “true limits of the provinces of Louisiana and Texas.”1 
In response to the U.S. claim that it had acquired Texas in the Louisiana Purchase (1803), 
Father Pichardo evaluated thousands of colonial documents to determine that the two 
coterminous territories had been distinct historically. Since his Tratado de Pichardo Sobre 
Los Límites de Luisiana Y Tejas: Su Olvido Y Su Significado, many scholars have 
endeavored to research the history of these North American borderlands.2  
Herbert Eugene Bolton launched the study of Spanish-American borderlands into 
the purview of academic scholarship. His early works, With the Makers of Texas: A Source 
Reader in Texas History (1904) and Athanase de Mézières and the Louisiana-Texas 
Frontier, 1768–1780 (1914) provided scholars with analysis and primary documents that 
demonstrated the important roles of frontiersmen in establishing the edges of imperial 
territory.3 Though many criticized Bolton for his romanticized view of colonial Spanish 
settlement, his work revealed the complexity of the borderland, highlighting how 
exploration and reaction inspired its development.  
                                                          
1 Father José Antonio Pichardo’s original study on the “true limits” was subtitled: “An argumentative 
historical treatise with reference to the verification of the true limits of the provinces of Louisiana and 
Texas: written by Father Jose Antonio Pichardo, of the congregation of the oratory of San Felipe Neri, to 
disprove the claim of the United States that Texas was included in the Louisiana Purchase of 1803.” For a 
published translation of this Pichardo’s treatise, see Charles W. Hackett, ed., Pichardo’s Treatise on the 
Limits of Louisiana and Texas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1946). 
2 Pichardo completed his investigation before the Adams-Onís Treaty (1819) which set the current limits 
between Texas and Louisiana.  
3 Bolton, Herbert E. With the Makers of Texas; a source reader in Texas History (Austin: Gammel-
Statesman Publishing Co., 1904); Bolton, Herbert E. ed. Athanase de Mézières and the Louisiana-Texas 
Frontier, 1768-1780 :documents Published for the First Time, from the Original Spanish and French 
Manuscripts, Chiefly in the Archives of Mexico and Spain; Translated into English, Vol. 2 (Cleveland: 
1914): 19. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015017642250. 
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Successors of Bolton researched the details of boundary formation. Eleanor Claire 
Buckley recognized that “the history of early Spanish missions in Texas is a history of 
successive failure on Spain’s part to properly support establishments that were destined to 
guard what was clearly a danger point.”4 Isaac Joslin Cox’s “The Louisiana-Texas 
Frontier,” outlined the official colonial transformations of the border in a three-part series 
(1906-1913). Correctly, he saw that “Louisiana, under French domination, had been an 
intrusive colony…it was destined to contribute materially to the ultimate overthrow” of 
Spain’s hold in North America.5 Studies that are more recent, such as The Spanish Frontier 
in North America (1992) by David Weber, recognize the “entanglement” of imperial 
powers in colonizing the Americas.6 Weber highlighted how empires—specifically 
Spain—intertwined inevitably at their meeting points—with other empires in North 
America. Although this scholarship problematizes the definition of the “borderland,” it 
neglects to acknowledge the function of subalterns in shaping its boundaries.  
Gerald E. Poyo and Gilberto M. Hinojosa provided a much-needed collection of 
case studies concerning the frontier settlers of Texas.7 Likewise, the research of H. F. 
                                                          
4Buckley, Eleanor Claire. “The Aguayo Expedition into Texas and Louisiana, 1719-1722.” The Quarterly 
of the Texas State Historical Association 15, (1911): 4. 
5 Cox, Isaac Joslin. “The Louisiana-Texas Frontier.” The Quarterly of the Texas State Historical 
Association 10, (1906): 1–2. 
6 Weber, David J. The Spanish Frontier in North America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). Eliga 
Gould recognizes the inevitable “entanglement” of imperial powers in their colonial projects throughout the 
Atlantic, see Gould, Eliga H. “Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a 
Spanish Periphery.” The American Historical Review 112, no. 3 (June 1, 2007): 764–86. Likewise, I rely on 
the ideas of centers and peripheries posited in Cardim, Pedro. Polycentric Monarchies How Did Early 
Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve and Maintain a Global Hegemony? Chicago: Sussex Academic Press, 
2012. 
7 Poyo, Gerald Eugene and Gilberto Miguel Hinojosa, eds. Tejano Origins in Eighteenth-Century San 
Antonio (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991). 
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Gregory and Francis X. Galán examined life at Los Adaes offered historical and 
anthropological insights regarding society on the colonial periphery.8 While the above-
mentioned are important investigations, these studies fall short of acknowledging the 
impact of itinerate individuals on the determination of the border. Though Fugitive 
Landscapes: The Forgotten History of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (2006) by Samuel 
Truett offered a clear example of the transnational nature of borderlands, the work focused 
on the nineteenth century, leaving the eighteenth century mostly unexplored.  
Likewise, scholars who have examined the effect runaway slaves had on the making 
of the borderlands remain focused on the nineteenth century. Sarah Cornell, Sean Kelley, 
and James D. Nichols have presented recent works on illegal slave migration to Mexico 
yet neglect to consider the legal and social precedents.9 Many of the studies on the 
experiences of borderlands slaves, fugitive or otherwise, tend to focus solely on Louisiana 
or Florida.10  
Yet during the eighteenth century, African slaves, mostly from Louisiana, also 
crossed visible and invisible barriers in search of freedom in Texas. Their success or failure 
                                                          
8 Gregory, H. F., George Avery, Aubra L. Lee, and Jay C. Blaine. “Presidio Los Adaes: Spanish, French, 
and Caddoan Interaction on the Northern Frontier.” Historical Archaeology 38, (2004): 65–77; Galán, 
Francis X. “Last Soldiers, First Pioneers: The Los Adaes Border Community of the Louisiana-Texas 
Frontier, 1721-1779” (Ph.D. diss., Southern Methodist University, 2006).  
9 Cornell, Sarah E. “Citizens of Nowhere: Fugitive Slaves and Free African Americans in Mexico, 1833–
1857.” Journal of American History 100, (2013): 351–74; Kelley, Sean. “‘Mexico in His Head’: Slavery 
and the Texas-Mexico Border, 1810-1860.” Journal of Social History 37, (2004): 709–23; Nichols, James 
D. “The Line of Liberty: Runaway Slaves and Fugitive Peons in the Texas-Mexico Borderlands.” Western 
Historical Quarterly 44, (2013): 413-433. 
10 Landers, Jane. Atlantic Creoles in the Age of Revolutions. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
2010); Landers, Jane. Black Society in Spanish Florida. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999); 
Burton, H. Sophie. Colonial Natchitoches: A Creole Community on the Louisiana-Texas Frontier. (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008).  
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in acquiring that emancipation determined subsequent understandings of the perceivable 
locations of liberty and autonomy in the Gulf region. Despite their role in forming the U.S. 
Southwestern borderland, many historians minimize the relevance of these historical actors 
by ignoring or portraying their existence as insignificant.11 
The current historiography on the Neutral Ground—the zone that separated Texas-
and Louisiana after the Louisiana Purchase—neglects to recognize how fugitive slaves 
influenced the borderland policies of New Spain. The work of Isaac Joslin Cox and Julien 
Vernet clearly depict how the ill-defined frontier allowed for diplomatic collaboration 
between Spanish and American societies, but limit considerations to the elites.12 Studies 
that examine non-elite participation in determining the nineteenth-century boundary 
restrict their scope to the Louisianan territory.13  
The scholarly authority on the Neutral Ground, J. Villasana Haggard, elucidated 
the importance of subaltern interactions in maintaining the territorial boundaries. While he 
acknowledged the movement of fugitive slaves, he focused on illicit trade across the 
Neutral Ground as well as Spanish and Anglo-American competition for Native American 
                                                          
11 In Spanish Frontier, David Weber states that, “although blacks and mulattos could be found throughout 
the borderlands, African American history has more relevance to the Southeast than the Southwest” and 
that it is “tied to slave societies of the Atlantic and Caribbean.” Francis X. Galán agrees with Weber’s 
analysis and does not examine the relevance of Africans within the Southwestern borderland.  
12 Cox, Isaac Joslin. “General Wilkinson and His Later Intrigues with the Spaniards.” The American 
Historical Review 19, (1914): 794–812; Vernet, Julien. “Citizen Laussat and the St. Julien Case: Royalists 
and Revolutionaries in Early Nineteenth-Century Louisiana.” Louisiana History: The Journal of the 
Louisiana Historical Association 51, (2010): 195–214. 
13 Gelpi, Paul D., Jr. “Mr. Jefferson’s Creoles: The Battalion d’Orléans and the Americanization of Creole 
Louisiana, 1803-1815.” Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association 48, (2007): 
295–316; DuVal, Kathleen. “Choosing Enemies: The Prospects for an Anti-American Alliance in the 
Louisiana Territory.” The Arkansas Historical Quarterly 62, (2003): 233–52.  
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loyalties within it.14 This study will add to that literature by exploring how fugitive slaves 
complicated the neutrality of this “Neutral Ground.” By pursuing the benefit of Spanish 
asylum laws, runaways influenced political activity along the tenuous frontier and 
problematized the diplomatic relations between the territories.  
Scholarship concerning the enforcement of asylum and migration policies along the 
eighteenth-century Spanish borderlands is sparse. Most of the research has focused on 
Spanish Florida where imperial officials granted freedom to runaway slaves long before 
offering it in Texas.15 The studies that have explored the regulations that governed the 
return or harboring of fugitives in the Southern borderlands have focused on the Mexican 
era.16 The implementation of restitution and extradition policies along the nineteenth-
century frontier of New Spain presents an untapped opportunity for accessing the local 
realities of Spain’s final years as sovereign.  
A related literature has explored how slaves understood geography although it 
primarily focuses on the antebellum U.S. South. Stephanie Camp, in particular, began to 
articulate how slaves created alternate understandings of space, a phenomena that also 
occurred along the Louisiana-Texas border. She explained how their “rival geography was 
                                                          
14 Haggard, J. Villasana. “The Counter-Revolution of Béxar, 1811.” The Southwestern Historical Quarterly 
43, (1939): 222–35; Haggard, J. Villasana. “The House of Barr and Davenport.” The Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly 49, (1945): 66–88; Haggard, J. Villasana. “The Neutral Ground between Louisiana 
and Texas, 1806-1821.” (PhD diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1942). 
15 Landers, Jane. “Spanish Sanctuary: Fugitives in Florida, 1687-1790.” The Florida Historical Quarterly 
62, (1984): 296–313. 
16 Cornell, Sarah E. “Citizens of Nowhere,” 351–374; Kelley, “‘Mexico in His Head,’” 709–723; Nichols, 
“The Line of Liberty,” 413-433; Cleven, Andrew N. “The Convention Between Spain and Holland 
Regulating the Return of Deserters and Fugitive Slaves in Their American Colonies.” The Journal of Negro 
History 14, (1929): 341–344.  
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characterized by motion: the secret movement of bodies, objects, and information within 
and around plantation space.”17 Slave resistance, in the form of flight beyond the planation, 
resulted in a rival geography that included an amorphous emancipatory space.18 While U.S. 
laws buttressed a “geography of containment that aimed to control slave mobility in space 
and in time,”19 Spanish practices provided an alternative spatialization of the Gulf, one of 
which bondsmen took advantage.  
Ultimately, this report proposes that micro-level interactions of border crossers 
influenced the ways in which locals affirmed or dismissed official conceptualizations of 
geopolitical space. Interactions with individuals on the move affected the ways in which 
frontiersmen thought about their territory. The following section demonstrates how non-
elites participated in creating such porous understandings of international frontiers. 
  
                                                          
17 Camp, Stephanie M.H. “The Pleasures of Resistance: Enslaved Woman and Body Politics in the 
Plantation South, 1830-1861,” The Journal of Southern History 68, (2002): 535. 
18 The author uses the term “emancipatory space” to describe the location where individuals imagined 
liberty was available. It is necessarily vague because the individuals who conceptualized of the space did 
not define it with certainty. It applies to both slaves and soldiers who searched for better lives outside of 
their local situations. 
19 Camp, “Pleasures of Resistance,” 544. 
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Chapter 1: Memories of Early Border Crossers 
In the summer of 1721, Don Joseph Gonzales examined the scenic prairies and 
canopied woodlands of East Texas. Gonzales was traveling under the command of the 
marquis de San Miguel de Aguayo, the recently appointed governor of Coahuila and Texas. 
He scanned the Spanish territory for any sign of French settlement. Nearly two years had 
passed since a small group of Frenchmen had overcome the isolated mission at San Miguel 
del los Adaes. New Spain’s viceroy had ordered the party of some five hundred soldiers to 
reestablish the presence of the kingdom in the frontier region. Given that the French had 
successfully secured a hold at the mouth of the Mississippi River by 1699, all subsequent 
intrusions westward into Spanish territory had become imperial threats.20  
The possibility of further foreign infringement upon New Spain’s province 
compelled King Philip V to order Gonzales and the rest of the reconquering party to “force 
the French to abandon the territory they unjustly” held on Spanish land.21 Although the 
coronation of Philip V placed a Bourbon monarch on the throne, which allowed Frenchmen 
to take “root on the Gulf during an interlude of harmonious relations with Spain,” the 
monarchy was not interested in forfeiting any more of its American soil.22 However, as 
Aguayo’s company marched towards Louisiana to defend the imperial frontier, many of 
                                                          
20 Historians refer to the 1719 French seizure of Los Adaes as the “Chicken War.” Upon entering Los 
Adaes, the invaders discovered a priest, a soldier, and a host of chickens. Not wanting to return to 
Natchitoches empty handed the Frenchmen took the chickens. For a brief overview of the settlement of 
New Spain’s frontier, see Weber, Spanish Frontier in North America, 157-171. 
21 Correspondence, King Philip V to Viceroy Zúñiga y Guzmán the Marquis of Valero, 1719, quotation in 
Weber, Spanish Frontier, 167.  
22 Weber, Spanish Frontier, 159. 
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the soldiers did not know where the authority of Spain ended and the sovereignty of France 
began.  
In July of 1721, the traveling force came across a small band of French soldiers at 
the Neches River—a site much closer to New Spain’s interior than Los Adaes. Gonzales 
and the company observed as the marquis de Aguayo negotiated with the Commandant 
General of Natchitoches—the settlement from which Frenchmen had invaded Los Adaes 
in 1719. Aguayo persuaded the intruders to retreat to their Louisiana posts. Nonetheless, 
the new governor determined that the French would not surrender their American 
settlements.23 To protect the remainder of Spain’s North American territory, the party 
would have to develop its frontier west of the French. 
Having pushed the Frenchmen back, Aguayo and his men contemplated how best 
to secure the isolated settlements of New Spain.24 To deter further westward European 
encroachment, they decided to reinforce the location near the original mission at los 
Adaes—a recorded “seven leagues from Natchitoches.”25 The soldiers built a presidio 
directly west of the Colorado River.26 The soldiers cleared the woods to give the presidio 
better visibility of the land. As Gonzales participated in the laborious task, he noticed three 
buildings already established on the western side of the river—only five leagues away.27 
                                                          
23 Cox, “The Lousiana-Texas Frontier,” 13-27. 
24 Ibid.; Buckley, “The Aguayo Expedition into Texas and Louisiana, 1719-1722,” 1–65; Hackett, Charles 
W. “The Marquis of San Miguel de Aguayo and His Recovery of Texas from the French, 1719-1723.” The 
Southwestern Historical Quarterly 49, (1945): 193–214; Weber, Spanish Frontier, 167. 
25 Seven leagues are equal to approximately 38.5 km; this discrepancy caused the frontiersmen much 
confusion (see footnote 26).  
26 While Spanish colonists knew this river as the “Colorado,” today it is the “Red River.” For the purpose 
of this essay, the author will use the nomenclature of the Spanish settlers. 
27 Approximately 21 km. Deposition of Don Joseph Gonzales in Barrios’ interrogatory, see: Proceedings, 
September 1752, Los Adaes, Bexar Archives (BA), microfilm (mf), 9:422-438 
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Indeed, Gonzales and his companions would notice many markers on the frontier that 
would confound their conceptualizations of their domain. 
These initial experiences proved instrumental to the way settlers later understood 
the frontier. The actions of their local authorities made lasting impressions on the residents 
of Los Adaes: they were unsure of their kingdom’s domain. Thinking back to their time in 
the borderland, Adaesaños recalled divergent locations of imperial divisions and remained 
confused about the actual limits of New Spain.28 Two mid-century interrogatories speak to 
this link between foggy memory and borderline location.  
Elusive Borders and Hearsay 
In 1729, Los Adaes became the first capital of Texas and remained New Spain’s 
northern frontier community for most of the eighteenth century. Soldiers from Aguayo’s 
expedition, like Gonzales, had been some of the first occupants to settle the region. In 1751, 
when disputes arose over the boundary separating the Spanish presidio from the 
neighboring Natchitoches—a concern of imperial proportions—officials relied upon of the 
memories of this vanguard of early Los Adaes settlers to determine the limits of Spanish 
sovereignty in that region. 
As recorded in interrogatories and questionnaires, residents of the Louisiana-Texas 
borderland used their recollections, daily observations, and repeated hearsay to define the 
dividing line between the colonies. Their reflections reveal that the movement of people—
priests, Spanish and French deserters, fugitive slaves, criminals, and vagabonds—across 
                                                          
28 To understand the confusion of Adaesaños, this analysis assumes a hazy frontier and does not impose a 
definitive boundary (e.g. the Colorado River) that, evidently, was never established. 
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certain landmarks determined how they conceptualized and interacted with the colonial 
“border.” Even though the frontier changed according to official sovereignties in far off 
metropoles, locals also continued to influence understandings of imperial limits. The 
frequent migration of individuals, legal and illegal, reinforced the way frontiersmen 
spatially imagined sovereignty, liberty, and opportunity. The true border then, in 
accordance with its many wayfarers, was not static. 
Even in the mid-eighteenth century, the boundary between New Spain and New 
France remained unclear. Illicit trade and socializing between Los Adaes and Natchitoches 
had blurred the imperial distinctiveness separating the settlements.29 Spanish officials 
feared that the porous nature of the frontier could compromise their territorial claims. Thus, 
“to prevent the exposure of our dominions to the pernicious consequences of laxity,” the 
king requested that the viceroy “exercise the greatest wisdom and watchfulness in order to 
check the advance of the [French].”30 Honoring this request required a clear delineation of 
the French position. The attempts to establish the limits of Texas provide striking insight 
into how migration and memory affected boundary formation.  
In 1750, the task of fortifying New Spain’s frontier fell upon Governor Jacinto de 
Barrios y Jáuregui of Texas. He interviewed the oldest inhabitants of Los Adaes asking 
                                                          
29 Galán, Francis Xavier. “Presidio Los Adaes: Worship, Kinship, and Commerce with French Natchitoches 
on the Spanish-Franco-Caddo Borderlands, 1721-1773” Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana 
Historical Association 49, (2008): 191–208; Gregory, H. F., George Avery, Aubra L. Lee, and Jay C. 
Blaine. “Presidio Los Adaes: Spanish, French, and Caddoan Interaction on the Northern Frontier.” 
Historical Archaeology 38, (2004): 65–77. Loren, Diana DiPaolo. “The Intersections of Colonial Policy 
and Colonial Practice: Creolization on the Eighteenth-Century Louisiana/Texas Frontier.” Historical 
Archaeology 34, (2000): 85–98. 
30 Proceedings, September 1752, Los Adaes, Bexar Archives (BA), microfilm (mf), 9:422-438. 
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them to identify the “dividing line between the two monarchies.” The interviewees, many 
of whom were the original settlers of the presidio, were to state “how long, why, and in 
what manner” the boundaries they recognized formed the correct division.31 It is telling 
that not a single witness claimed to know the dividing line with certainty. However, several 
Adaesaños cited the movement of priests and other migrants across prominent geographic 
markers to support their imprecise conclusions. 
Border-Crossing Priests 
Priests became border definers because the clerics at Los Adaes had a long tradition 
of performing religious services for the French at Natchitoches. As early as 1716, 
Frenchmen in Louisiana had called upon priests from Los Adaes to administer the Catholic 
sacraments. Many obliged these requests early on, since French chaplains were not 
immediately available.32 Religious priorities thus took precedence over the 
acknowledgement of imperial boundaries 
Clerical reciprocity over the boundaries continued throughout the colonial period. 
Upon the death of Saint-Denis, the founder of Natchitoches, for example, Spanish priests 
crossed over into French territory to attend the funeral. Even on the eve of Governor Barrios 
y Jáuregui’s attempts to set boundaries, Father Fray Pedro Ramírez admitted to visiting 
Natchitoches “from time to time…for the purpose of having frequent recourse to the holy 
                                                          
31 Proceedings, September 1752, Los Adaes, BA, mf, 9:422-438. 
32 Galán, “Last Soldiers, First Pioneers,” 19-20. 
16 
 
sacraments.”33 When clerics disregarded imperial limits, for religious reasons or otherwise, 
they complicated the ways in which locals understood the border.  
For example, when Don Joseph Gonzales responded to the governor’s questions, 
he supposed that the Colorado River was the dividing line between Spanish and French 
territory because, at one point, a priest had refused to cross it. Gonzales recalled that in 
1729, Fray Francisco Vallego had agreed to baptize the son of Saint-Denis, the 
Commandment General of Natchitoches. However, Vallego would not perform the 
sacrament on the eastern side of the Colorado River. Determined to see his son baptized, 
Saint-Denis eventually agreed to “pass over to this part of the said river, where,” he 
reasoned, “the land belongs to the Catholic King.”34 
Marcos Ruiz, another settler, recalled the same event to identify the colonial 
boundary. As he remembered, Fray Vallego had agreed to perform the baptism for Saint-
Denis’s son only to refuse at a later point. According to Ruiz, the persistent French 
commander agreed to “cross to this part of the river” so that the priest could baptize his 
son on the property of New Spain.35  Vallego’s steadfast restraint had convinced Ruiz that 
the “Most Catholic Kingdom” was the territory west of the Colorado River. 
Although neither Gonzales nor Ruiz detailed the quarrel, their descriptions suggest 
that the controversy arose over an issue of territorial sovereignty. The soldiers concluded 
                                                          
33 Proceedings, August 20, 1750, as quoted in Charles W. Hackett, ed., Pichardo’s Treatise on the Limits of 
Louisiana and Texas, Vol. IV (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1946), 15. 
34 While both Spain and France were Catholic kingdoms at this time, the Spanish king was the “Most 
Catholic Majesty” and the French king was the “Most Christian Majesty.” Proceedings, September 1752, 
Los Adaes, BA, mf, 9:422. 
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that, by refusing to perform a baptism on land that did not pertain to Spain’s king, Father 
Vallego and Saint-Denis had identified an imperial limit: land east of the Colorado River 
pertained to New France, while the land west of it belonged to New Spain. Several 
interviewed soldiers identified events like this as evidence of a political distinction along 
the Colorado River. Given the inconsistency of their religious leaders however—one priest 
would refuse to perform a baptism while another would attend a burial years later—it is no 
surprise that frontiersmen considered the imperial boundaries elusive and flexible.  
Such imperial breaches of priests and the confluence of religious practice in these 
contested borderlands might have rightfully concerned New Spain’s highest officials. As a 
result, in their correspondence to the viceroy, Los Adaes locals would sometimes omit 
details concerning the inter-imperial interactions on the frontier. For example, upon the 
death of Saint-Denis, Governor Boneo y Morales and a Los Adaes priest attended the 
Frenchmen’s funeral at Natchitoches and performed religious honors. However, the 
governor did not mention this display of respect in his subsequent letter to the viceroy. 
Instead, he stated, “St. Denis is dead; thank God; now we can breathe more easily.” There 
was a clear discrepancy between those inter-imperial relationships that royal officials 
accepted and those that frontier officials maintained.  
Given the contradictory actions of their spiritual and political leaders, frontiersmen 
relied on additional markers to reckon the imperial boundaries of New Spain. Ostensibly, 
permanent fixtures in the area provided tangible signs of a dividing line. For instance, in 
the minds of Adaesaños, three houses stood out as prominent points belonging to a dividing 
line. 
18 
 
 Three Houses  
For settlers of Los Adaes, foreign dwellings located near their presidio blurred the 
lines of sovereignty. Before Aguayo’s expedition arrived to East Texas in 1721, the French 
had built three small houses along the western bank of the Colorado River (MAP 2) that 
remained erect throughout the eighteenth century. Since many Adaesaños generally 
believed that lands west of the river belonged to Spain, the structures stood as a continued 
sign of French intrusion. Many frontiersmen read the undisturbed existence of the houses 
as an affront to Spanish dominion, or worse, the tenuous French hold on the borders of the 
Spanish empire. However others settlers read their unproblematic existence as a sign of 
Spanish control over the region.  
For instance, Don Joseph interpreted the presence of the houses as a sign of Spanish 
sovereignty west of the Colorado River. He recalled that “tres casitas,” or three small 
houses, had harmlessly remained on the western bank of the river since the Aguayo 
expedition. The French had made no efforts to remove since. Their unproblematic 
existence, he deduced, confirmed that the river drew the respected border between the 
empires.36 Likewise, Don Juan Antonio Morín, a sixty-eight year old lieutenant at Los 
Adaes, also referred to these “three houses” in his deposition. The houses, he supposed, 
belonged to the French and had “remained without incident” since Aguayo and his Spanish 
force reconnoitered the river and discovered them in 1721.37 Thus, although hesitatingly, 
                                                          
36 Proceedings, September 1752, Los Adaes, BA, mf, 9:429.  
37 Proceedings, September 1752, Los Adaes, BA, mf, 9:422-438.  
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he reasoned that the Colorado River was a commonly recognized boundary and that the 
Spanish controlled the western bank. 
 
 
MAP 2 – Detail: Carte General de toute le Cote de la Louisianne jusqu'a la Baye St. Bernard (1747); 
The cartographer included several structures west of the Colorado River in his rendering of 
Natchitoches (originally labeled with the red letter ‘K’) 
 
 
Not all Adaesaños shared the understandings of Gonzalez and Morín concerning 
the three houses. Don Phelipe Muñoz de Mora remembered a more problematic history 
concerning the ownership of these structures and, subsequently, their implications for the 
frontier. In his deposition, the sixty-six year old recalled a discussion between Aguayo and 
20 
 
Saint-Denis concerning the houses. Allegedly, the Natchitoches commander had agreed to 
remove “his ranch… along with the other two houses.”38 According to Mora, the structures 
not only belonged to the leader of the French settlement, but they were also intact despite 
an official agreement to raze them. After thirty years without a change, the houses stood as 
a reminder of an unfulfilled negotiation between Spanish and French commanders. 
Five other witnesses corroborated the testimony of Muñoz de Mora. They declared 
that the original arrangement was to remove the three French buildings from the western 
bank.39 Nonetheless, the structures had remained unmolested for thirty years. Although the 
structures were seemingly innocuous, because Natchitoches officials never removed the 
houses, they symbolized a potential challenge to Spanish dominion: a hazard of which 
many Adaesaños were well aware. These subtle disagreements about the use of local space 
confused frontiersmen and influenced their perception of the boundary separating the 
monarchies. 
In the 1752 investigation, every single deponent recognized these three houses as 
evidence testifying to the ambiguous boundary between the colonies. While most assumed 
that the Colorado River was the dividing line, the physical presence of the long-standing 
structures raised doubt. The inferential wisdom of one Adaesaño, Manuel Salbador de 
Pozos, summarized the perplexing character of these three houses. He stated, “the laxity 
and dissimulation” of the frontier “was the source of the opinion that the Colorado River 
was the dividing line.” However, the presence of the houses “made more plausible the 
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report…that the dividing line between the two presidios was the Great Mountain or Arroyo 
Hondo.”40 Indeed, when frontiersmen doubted that the Colorado River was the true divide, 
they recognized that the Gran Montaña-Arroyo Hondo plateau was another possibility. 
Witnesses claimed that runaways reinforced the legitimacy of this alternative boundary, as 
they would cross this stretch of land to escape foreign rulers and attain their autonomy. 
 Deserters 
Not only the presence of houses but also the logistics of colonial desertions helped 
to locate imperial divisions between Texas and Louisiana. Many Adaesaños used the 
spaces where deserters achieved liberty to identify the furthest reaches of Spanish and 
French power. The limits of desertion, or how far a deserting soldier had to travel into 
Spanish territory before the French no longer pursued him, signaled the practical 
constraints of imperial sovereignty. Military officials on either side of the border would 
pursue the deserters up until certain respected points, or if they pushed further, they would 
consequently challenge the boundary. In this way, the frontier also came into being due to 
the dialectic between officials and fugitives. 
For Adaesaños, successfully evading pursuit in an act of desertion meant that one 
had crossed over the imperial boundary. In Barrios y Jauregui’s first investigation, every 
witness utilized the limits of desertion as proof to support the boundary he had identified. 
For instance, Muñoz de Mora stated that “all the deserters from [the east] side who came 
to this [west] side of the river were free from all risk.”41 He had observed French deserters 
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41 Interrogatory Report, quotation in Hackett, ed., Pichardo’s Treatise, VOL. IV, 12. 
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noting that officials would accept their escape once they crossed the Colorado River.  He 
explained how Spanish deserters likewise evaded arrest once they “went across the river.”42 
Another witness, Don Pedro de Sierra, was more explicit in his description. Sierra claimed 
that “land on this [west] side of the [Colorado] river belonged to Spain…for whenever any 
of [the French] deserted, they did not follow him farther than to the river, and the same 
happened to those deserting from this side.”43 The responses of Adaesaños questioned the 
next year reveal the same rationale.  
During the second round of investigations, many witnesses recognized that the 
Colorado River was one recognized boundary but several also identified the Gran Montaña 
or the Arroyo Hondo as another possible imperial limit. When Don Pedro de Sierra testified 
for the second time, he determined that the plateau had become the dividing line which 
“was proved by the fact that” by 1752 deserters had to run further to escape successfully. 
He clarified, “before the French…did not pursue their deserters beyond the opposite bank 
of the said river, while at the present time they pursued them as far as Arroyo Hondo.”44 
Utilizing evasion as evidence, Sierra recognized a moment at which the boundary had 
shifted in response to illicit migration.  
The logic of these soldiers suggests a direct correlation between evasion success 
and conceptual reconfiguration of geopolitical power. When imperial authorities chased 
runways—deserting soldiers or other fugitives—further into either territory, perceptions of 
imperial power shifted. For instance, another witness who had settled Los Adaes with 
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Aguayo also recognized a transformation in the respected boundary. Felipe Sánchez 
recollected that the French “pursued the deserters of that nation to [the Colorado] river,” 
during the initial years of settlement. However, in 1752 he noted, “now the [French] pursue 
them much farther in this [westward] direction,” making el Arroyo Hondo a recognized 
boundary between the territories.45 Sánchez reasoned that the French approached this 
extended boundary confidently because they “had the Indians on their side, they being very 
numerous and exceedingly skillful in the use of firearms.”46 However, Native American 
allies were not only geopolitical advantage for the French settlers of the frontier.  
In addition to their alliances with Indians, the residents of Natchitoches also 
enjoyed the labor of bondsmen. “Officials and inhabitants of Natchitoos depend for their 
subsistence on their multitude of slaves,” explained the Texas governor. He continued: 
“one official has forty-four and the relatively poorer ones have two or three” slaves.47 In 
contrast to the residents of French Louisiana, Spanish colonists owned few slaves in the 
northern reaches of New Spain. Those slaves existing along the frontier either belonged to 
the rich or were hiding away from masters as bondsmen from Louisiana often sought 
liberty in Texas. In the same way as deserters, runaway slaves, who slaveholders 
considered fugitives, influenced the spatial realities of liberty. Though Adaesaños did not 
refer to runaway slaves in their responses to the questionnaires, their frequent escapes into 
the New Spain’s territory influenced the laws governing the borderland. 
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 Boundaries of Bondage 
Runaway slaves affected the application of justice along the frontier because they 
caused borderland disputes that had to be negotiated by local officials. These included 
governors, who often administered law in the northern periphery due to the absence of 
trained legal magistrates.48 In the tradition of New Spain’s eighteenth-century legal culture, 
the preservation of such justice meant maintaining “the well-being and harmony of the 
community.”49  
Yet Spanish law was not static, but rather “adaptable to the peculiar needs of the 
diverse regions of the empire.”50 Given the site-specific nature of the justice system, at 
times, the Texas governor complied with the law, at other times, he undermined it. 
Likewise, his commandants located at frontier presidios operated under the same rationale. 
The regular presence of runaway slaves in Texas throughout its Spanish period forced 
borderland officials to discuss asylum protocol as well as the process of extradition and 
restitution. Additionally, the close proximity of the French meant that Texas authorities 
had to keep their settlement secure in the midst of an imperial enemy.  
The manumission of slaves proved a possible tactic for weakening the French. In 
1753, the same year that he had collected testimonies to determine an imperial boundary 
Barrios y Jáuregui suggested the proclamation of freedom for all slaves living in Louisiana.  
He asked Juan Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas, viceroy of New Spain: “to issue a 
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proclamation to the effect that all slaves who might come here would enjoy their freedom 
and the protection of the king.”51 Perhaps Barrios y Jáuregui had arrived at the conclusion 
that the boundaries were debatable, porous, and all together ill determined, and believed 
that subversion was New Spain’s only means to secure its territory.  
Spanish officials rejected the governor’s proposal to offer French slaves freedom 
officially. Nonetheless, many slaves living in Louisiana sought refuge in Spanish Texas. It 
is impossible to say with certainty what runaway slaves knew about the opportunity for 
manumission in Texas. Their voices rarely emerge in the historical record.52 Rather, their 
lives were often determined in informal dealings between officials who had little incentive 
to document the subaltern experience. However, it is evident by their actions that slaves 
understood that an area west of Louisiana functioned as a space of possible liberty. Hence, 
runaway slaves adhered to desertion logic, and traveled westward over elusive boundaries 
in pursuit of self-emancipation.  
Indeed, slave owners often requested that Spanish officials return their bondsmen 
who had escaped into Texas. For example, in 1757 the governor of Louisiana, Louis 
Belcourt, Chevalier de Kerlerec, informed governor Barrios y Jáuregui that a slave from 
his colony had taken refuge in a Texas mission.53 Kerlerec requested that the Spanish 
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governor send the runaway slave back to Louisiana. Coming after his failed attempt to offer 
freedom to the slaves in Louisiana, the Texas governor treated the request with caution. 
Before taking any action, the governor turned to his superiors in the viceregal court of New 
Spain.  
On April 5, 1758, the Marqués de Aranda, a fiscal, or crown attorney, responded to 
Barrios y Jáuregui’s inquiry. Aranda felt that Iberian laws should determine frontier 
decisions. He likened the Texas situation with runaway slaves to the peninsular experience 
with Portuguese “offenders who go to the Kingdom of Castile, and returning to Castile the 
offenders who go to the Kingdom of Portugal.” For these extradition cases, he charged, 
judges were to follow the “Fifth and Sixth Laws of Title Sixteen, Eighth Book of the 
Recopilación de Castilla.”54 Hence, to administer justice in situations involving foreign 
fugitives, he thought it appropriate to follow protocol outlined in that royal cédula, or royal 
decree.  
Quoting this official decree, Aranda stated that it was the duty of Spanish officers 
“to protect the person of the criminal,” or in the case of Barrios y Jáuregui, the runaway 
slave.55 Once Aranda explained the Iberian precedent, he concluded: “it is not practicable 
for the governor of Texas to deliver…the negro offender from that French colony.” Since 
the aforementioned slave had “taken refuge in one of the missions of the said government 
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and in the province of Texas,”56 justice fell under the jurisdiction of New Spain and, 
therefore, under Spanish law.  
Fiscal Aranda declared that Texas officials should first discover if the runaway had 
committed any crimes prior to absconding, and then confirm his guilt or innocence before 
deciding to send the slave back to his master. The process implied a degree of protection 
for innocent parties and did not assume the automatic return of runaways. Henceforth, 
Aranda announced that, “all such cases should be sorted out” with respect to these 
provisions.57  
However, the instructions to assess the misdeeds of runaways before returning them 
to bondage arrived too late. While distant Spanish officials contemplated decrees issued in 
faraway royal centers, the realities on the frontier required more immediate and creative 
solutions. By March of 1758, Barrios y Jauregui had become impatient. After five months 
without receiving directions from Mexico City, the governor informed Viceroy Agustín 
Ahumada y Villalón, the Marqués de las Amarillas that he had made the executive decision 
to return the runaway slave to his Louisiana master.58  
Perhaps Barrios y Jauregui feared the repercussions of withholding the slave from 
his French master. Inaction might have disrupted any “harmony” that may have existed 
between the territories. It is also possible that, after harboring the slave for five months, 
Los Adaes no longer had the resources necessary to provide for the runaway’s material 
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needs. Though Aranda emphasized the need to adhere to peninsular protocol when 
managing New Spain’s frontier, the distinct issues of this borderland led to inconsistencies 
in restitution and extradition practices.  
Thus, the unyielding intrusion of foreign bodies into the northern periphery 
necessitated a continuous redetermination of frontier law and borderland society. Illicit 
migrants were not always unwelcome; however, their sanctioned settlement was contingent 
on the territorial security of Spanish Texas at any given moment. Political and economic 
issues determined if the presence of outsiders was advantageous or disadvantageous to the 
overall security of the territory. Officials made changes to frontier practices accordingly.  
Overall, before the Spanish occupation of Louisiana, frontiersmen had developed a 
general understanding of New Spain’s northeastern “borderland.” According to their 
definitions, it had limits that were negotiable and inconsistent. For deserters and runaways, 
it also provided the opportunity for liberty. Dissatisfied soldiers and daring slaves traversed 
the space until they were free, or arrested. As witness testimony and legal practices 
demonstrate, the actions of border crossers stretched the limits of imperial power and 
influenced local and official understandings of a dividing line. The common association of 
the Spanish frontier as a site of opportunity and liberty as well as the imprecise location of 
the territorial boundaries distinguishing Texas from Louisiana persisted once the imperial 
boundary collapsed, or, after the two territories fell under the same monarchy. 
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Chapter 2: Foreigners and Natives 
During the Seven Years War (1756-63), official treaties between Spanish and 
French kingdoms reconfigured the boundary between their sovereignties in the Gulf Coast. 
On November 23, 1762, French officials ceded Louisiana to Spain in secret under the 
Treaty of Fontainebleau. Meanwhile, with the 1763 Treaty of Paris, France consigned the 
territory east of the Mississippi to Great Britain. 
During this transition, French officials encouraged their colonists living in the 
eastern territory to migrate to lands controlled by France. Unaware of Spain’s recent 
acquisition of Louisiana, however, many settlers moved to the gulf colony.59 When the 
Treaty of Fontainebleau became public knowledge in April of 1764, recent French migrants 
learned that the sovereign of their new home was the Spanish king. Several colonists were 
discontent with the new rule, specifically the financial instability that came with it, and 
decided to head west. By evading Louisiana authority, Spanish and French settlers 
migrating to Texas threatened the security of the old settlements.60 They were foreign to 
Texas, thus their actions warranted additional scrutiny.  
Spanish and French Foreigners  
In 1766, Antonio de Ulloa arrived, in La Beliez, Louisiana as the first Spanish 
governor of the territory.61 The advent of the new rule, however, prompted extreme 
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measures of unrest in New Orleans. Although Ulloa traveled with Spanish troops, the 
Frenchmen made it impossible for him to govern, as they did not accept his rule. The new 
administrator had to rely on the old Acting Governor of Louisiana, Charles Philippe Aubry, 
to control the province.62 Ulloa’s inability to provide salaries for soldiers, along with his 
attempts to dissolve the French system of governance, exasperated his tenuous hold on the 
colony.  
Shortly after Ulloa arrived, the Spanish king increased the annual allowance for 
Louisiana from 150,000 pesos to 250,000 pesos.63 Generous as it was, Spain did not have 
the silver to provide that annuity, let alone honor the original budget.64 By the summer of 
1767, “French and Spanish commissariats in Louisiana had been forced to suspend all 
payments” to soldiers.65  
Budgetary constraints heightened the grievances of the inhabitants and further 
weakened the governorship of Ulloa. Desperately reporting to the viceroy of New Spain, 
Don Antonio María de Bucareli y Ursúa, Ulloa declared that the lack of funds had resulted 
“not only in seditious and insolent rumors, but also very extravagant threats.”66 
Unfortunately, the financial situation only worsened by wintertime. The price of goods had 
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risen which forced colonists to rely on credit.67 Unable to secure their material needs, 
neither Spanish nor French colonists were content with the administrative changes in 
Louisiana.  
Though Ulloa recognized the hopelessness of the situation, he made efforts to keep 
the soldiers from leaving the colony and attempted to strengthen the Louisiana-Texas 
boundary. Yet given such economic turmoil, soldiers began deserting their posts in 
Louisiana and migrating to Texas. On May 18, 1767, Ulloa sent a letter addressing the 
issue to Angel de Martos y Navarrete, the Governor of Texas. Ulloa stated that “various 
Spanish deserters” had passed into Texas were “practicing theft” and taking “items that 
pertained to the Royal Treasury.”68 With the viceroy’s consent, he requested that Martos y 
Navarrete send all deserters to Mexico City where they would receive the consequences of 
their betrayals.  
“Do not allow,” Ulloa warned, “any person, Spanish, French, or one of another 
nation to pass” from Louisiana to Texas.69 By attempting to control the movement of 
soldiers, he drew greater distinctiveness between Texas and Louisiana. Governor Martos y 
Navarrete was to arrest anyone who was complicit in these desertions. 
Ulloa’s letter revealed his distrust of French officials. He insisted that Martos y 
Navarrete not “trust any French commander in the colony” with the fugitive soldiers. The 
French, he observed “could not help but offer assistance” to these criminals and would 
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jeopardize his authority.70 The governor’s statements also suggest that he suspected that 
French and Spanish soldiers conspired in their desertions. Given the dire economic 
situation they shared, it is a logical conclusion. As a whole, his concerns indicate the 
difficulties in maintaining authority over lesser officials, let alone control of the entire 
colony.  
Uniform treatment of deserters was difficult to implement on the periphery of 
empire. For instance, in June of 1767, Martos y Navarrete informed Commander Don Luis 
de LaPeriér of Natchitoches that he could not comply with his request to return six Spanish 
deserters to Louisiana. Martos y Navarrete implied that he could not do so given that he 
had not yet received Ulloa’s orders.71 The alleged delay in correspondence is just one 
example that demonstrates the difficulty of maintaining consistent juridical practices.  
Frontier governors and commanders also compromised legal practices on the 
border when they pursued their own agendas. Since LaPeriér was in Louisiana, and because 
he lacked orders from the viceroy, Martos y Navarrete asserted that the destiny of the 
deserters fell under his jurisdiction. He felt that he had no authority to send the rebels 
anywhere.  
However, Martos y Navarrete also thought that it was too expensive to keep the 
deserters in prison. He informed the Natchitoches commander that the fugitives would stay 
in Los Adaes and work its fields to compensate their expenses.72 Perhaps the shortage of 
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funds at the frontier motivated Martos y Navarrete’s decision to keep the deserters. The 
Los Adaes community survived on scarce resources and was always in need of additional 
laborers.73 On the frontier, officials could transform arrested deserters into a supplemental 
work force—a practice that would continue into the next century. 
To officials in Mexico City, the deserters, especially the French, remained foreign. 
Their frequent appearance in Texas attracted the attention of the viceroy. In July of 1768, 
Viceroy Carlos Francisco de Croix, the Marqués de Croix, ordered the new Governor of 
Texas, Hugo O’Conor, to forbid the settlement of all undocumented newcomers. 
According to the viceroy, foreigners were “those wanting to [occupy] lands in areas near 
lakes, ports, rivers, and other sites of interest.” This activity, he stated, “induces the greatest 
suspicion of infidelity” and disloyalty.74 Croix’s concerns imply that deserters and 
vagabonds had been establishing themselves in strategic locations on Spanish land. The 
actions of subaltern figures had disrupted the integrity of the frontier and influenced the 
official policies for border control once again. 
Likewise, runaway slaves continued to compromise colonial boundaries forcing 
officials to revise protocols during the region’s transitional period. In July of 1768, as in 
the previous decade, a commandant of Louisiana requested that the Texas governor return 
his runaway slave. Considering the frontier changes of the 1760s, O’Conor turned to the 
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viceroy for advice.  He questioned: With Spain in possession of Louisiana, should Texas 
officials continue to withhold runaway slaves from their masters? 
The ambiguities of imperial power made asylum for runaways even more difficult 
to achieve. In contrast to the earlier concessions of Marqués de Aranda, who protected 
runaways, Viceroy Marqués de Croix now ordered O’Conor to return all fugitive slaves to 
their masters in Louisiana. If they had not committed any punishable crimes, they were to 
send the deserters back immediately. 
If crime was the reason for a slave’s escape, Croix ordered O’Conor to “notify the 
French Commander” that he must “issue a caucion juratoria in favor of immunity” for the 
slave.75 This meant that the official requesting the return of a slave was to send the 
equivalent of a “release on one's own recognizance” agreement. As practiced in modern 
courts, this contract allowed the respective judge to release a defendant with the 
understanding that his or her trial would take place later.  
The result was that the party requesting the return of a runaway simply had to claim 
responsibility for the actions of that slave for the duration of his journey home. Whereas 
the previous practice did not privilege the restitution of slaves, the subsequent protocol 
expedited the process. Whether or not the fugitive had committed crimes, the Texas 
governor was to see to it that slaves returned to Louisiana. The Viceroy Croix concluded 
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the character of the frontier had changed “with respect to the difference between [1758] 
and [his] present” time.”76  
For the late decades of the eighteenth century, it was more difficult for slaves to 
find liberty within the Spanish borderlands. Nonetheless, bondsmen continued to travel 
west to secure liberty. Spain’s formal occupation of Louisiana added thousands of captive 
Africans to its purview. Frontiersmen loyal to either sovereign took advantage of this 
opportunity and sold slaves across the region. The legal and illegal movement of slaves 
between Texas and Louisiana increased after 1766. These border crossers perpetuated the 
muddled reality of imperial borders for the remainder of the century. Perceptive of this 
predicament, Spain soon sought to streamline its administration in the periphery. However, 
there were others, Native peoples, who also participated in the definitions of imperial 
limits.  
Moving Frontiers, Reconfiguring Native Ties   
Not only Spaniards, French, deserters, slaves, but also Native peoples defined 
geopolitical boundaries. A brief sketch of Spanish-Indian alliances reveals that European 
settlers and Indian nations of late eighteenth-century Texas also maintained disparate 
understandings of space and power. While this example is not a comprehensive discussion 
of native political cartography, which requires greater research, it suggests that competing 
notions of regional authority presented a myriad of possible realities for territorial 
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divisions. Spanish officials’ recognition of this fact is evident, for instance, in their 
concerns over leaving frontier positions. 
 In 1773, the Spanish monarch ordered the abandonment of Los Adaes and the East 
Texas missions. By then, Alexander O’Riley had definitively secured Spanish sovereignty 
over Louisiana and Luis de Ungaza y Amezaga had taken over as governor in 1770. The 
stability of the gulf territories allowed Spain a brief moment to reevaluate borderland posts.  
As Baron de Ripperdá, new governor of Texas, prepared his subordinates for the 
move, he considered those Native communities bordering East Texas settlements. In a 
letter to Ungaza y Amezaga, the governor reflected on the diplomatic ties frontier 
authorities maintained with Indian tribes. Ripperdá confessed that the Spanish 
“missions…have made no progress in many years.” They had failed to “convert” and 
“civilize” the natives who depended very little on the Spanish for material needs. In truth, 
the Spanish showed greater signs of dependence on natives than vice versa. Missionaries 
struggled to maintain political and trade ties with the indigenous of Texas—a difficult task 
considering that rival European settlers were vying for the same relationships.77  
                                                          
77 In the late eighteenth century, trading among indigenous groups and non-Spanish settlers was a common 
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Pena to Governor Unzaga y Amezaga, September 14, 1772. As quoted in Bolton, Herbert Eugene. 
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Time, from the Original Spanish and French Manuscripts, Chiefly in the Archives of Mexico and Spain; 
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Notwithstanding this confession, Governor Ripperdá alleged, “that this news will 
cause great surprise to the surrounding nations.”78 He supposed that these indigenous 
groups benefited from the “civilizing” presence of the Spanish. According to the governor, 
the friendly indigenous peoples of East Texas “were accustomed to living near the 
Spaniards and missions.”79 Evidently, the official was only referring to the tribes that fit 
within his understanding of Spanish domain or those that did not complicate their 
conceptualizations of space; those that did not cause major problems for the colonization 
of Texas. Their acquiescence of Spanish settlement led officials to believe that territory 
they thought they controlled was, in fact, under their rule. However, not all Native 
communities acquiesced or buttressed New Spain’s perceptions of political divisions in 
Texas.  
As one historian explained, Spaniards often “classified Indians according to their 
relationship with them.”80 Settlers interacted with Texas natives as either “workers, 
enemies or allies.” Outside the category of ally, the Comanche, Apache, and Osage nations 
maintained their own disparate associations with colonists.81 They were powerful societies 
and exercised greater regional power compared with the officials representing New Spain. 
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These communities inhabited a space and observed territorial boundaries of their own 
creation that complicated Spanish notions of territory. Their preeminence was impressive 
and demanded recognition. One official even praised the Comanches, stating, “there is no 
tribe from which more satisfaction and usefulness may be expected.”82  
Spanish security was contingent on the actions of these organized Native nations. 
In order to remain in the region, frontier officials had to consider the alternate 
understandings of space Indian groups observed. Likewise, Indigenous communities did 
not understand the Spanish or their settlements as a homogenous project.  
Considering the dynamic ties that entangled New Spain with indigenous and 
European enemies, governor Ripperdá was cautious not to break relations with friendly 
nations. In 1773, he aimed to maintain frontier allies despite the relocation of Spanish 
settlements. He asked Lieutenant-Governor Athanase de Mézières to inform the East Texas 
Native allies that “the Spaniards and missionaries are departing because now the 
inhabitants of Louisiana are as much Spaniards as those of San Antonio.”83  
Writing after less than a decade after the Treaty of Fontainebleau, Ripperdá 
believed the transition from French Louisiana to Spanish Louisiana was complete. Indian 
allies would be “as safe with them [the Louisianans] as with the Spaniards themselves.”84 
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While the success of the governor’s attempt at diplomacy is unclear, his method speaks to 
his conscious effort to appeal to Indigenous outlooks.  
Nonetheless, the anxieties of Ripperdá exhibit an idealistic and patronizing view of 
imperial sovereignty and Native politics. The governor’s belief that the indigenous 
communities appreciated or wanted Spanish friendship went against evidence to the 
contrary. Failed missions to incorporate local tribes, as well as sporadic hostilities from 
supposed allies, suggest that local Indians were not concerned with maintaining strong ties 
with the frontiersmen.85  
Even Texas veterans recognized Ripperdá’s naïve perspective. Raphael Pacheco, a 
longtime resident of Los Adaes, explained that “the ignorance and bad conduct of the 
governor” was to blame for the “backwardness of the inhabitants” of East Texas.86 He 
accused Ripperdá of ignoring “the repeated orders for the defensive war” against the Osage 
and Comanche.87 In a heated letter, Viceroy Bucareli y Ursúa also protested the actions of 
the governor. He averred, “with surprise” that, “notwithstanding the care and vigilance 
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which I repeatedly charged your Lordship to observe, to the end that you cease to be 
deluded by the deceitful promises and pretended peace-agreements of the Indians of those 
frontiers.”88  
In addition to credulous Native politics, the viceroy was also frustrated with the 
governor’s simple perceptions of Spanish and French relations. The old inhabitants of 
Louisiana had not yet earned the trust of Bucareli who admonished Ripperdá for 
fraternizing with the French. Moreover, the governor persisted in supplying Indians with 
guns despite Bucareli’s repeated demands to the contrary. Linking the two issues, the 
viceroy assumed the inhabitants of the newly incorporated territory were responsible for 
the regional arms trade. He ordered that the governor to “cut off absolutely, correspondence 
with the governor of Natchitoches and the rest of the Frenchmen.”89  
Unlike Ripperdá, the viceroy did not consider the Louisiana residents “as much 
Spaniards as those of San Antonio.”90 They acted according to their own economic 
interests, which threatened the security of Spanish Texas. For the viceroy, it is imperative 
that Texas and Louisiana remain distinct. To ensure this separation, the governor was not 
to permit Frenchmen to enter Bexar.  
Overall, the apprehensions that emerged in the correspondence concerning the 
repercussions of abandoning East Texas reveal several key insights about imperial 
boundaries.  As this short section suggests, a history of New Spain’s northern borderlands 
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that does not recognize the alternative mappings of indigenous groups is incomplete. 
Indians, as well as Spanish, and French settlers employed different understandings of 
political divisions in the Gulf Coast region.  Spaniards recognized the serious force that the 
surrounding Native nations comprised. Hence, the boundaries separating European and 
indigenous communities were necessarily fluid. Additional research will be necessary to 
reveal how regional power among these disparate groups shaped the borderlands northwest 
of the Louisiana-Texas frontier. For the purpose of this report, the actions of runaways 
provide an additional perspective.  
Fugitive slaves continued to shape New Spain’s borderlands through the turn of the 
eighteenth century. Political and juridical actions taken in response to runaway slaves 
escaping into Texas from Louisiana demonstrate the productive potential of illicit 
migration in shaping the limits of the Spanish borderlands and its regional character. The 
frequent escapes of runaways into New Spain influenced the laws governing the frontier 
making the eastern frontier of Texas a site of emancipatory space. This trend clearly 
emerges after the Louisiana Purchase, when Spanish officials pragmatically sheltered or 
returned runaway slaves in order to ensure the territory’s spatial integrity. 
  
42 
 
Chapter 3: Rival Geographies 
Disagreement over the boundaries of New Spain’s northern territory intensified 
after Napoleon sold Louisiana to the United States in 1803. The Spanish empire had never 
established formal geographic limits between Texas and Louisiana. Governor Barrios y 
Jáuregui’s midcentury attempts to do so resolved little and became irrelevant after Spain 
formally acquired Louisiana in 1765.  
This century of vaguely defined dividing lines became particularly problematic 
when U.S. officials attempted to claim as much land as possible. Thomas Jefferson, for 
instance, alleged that all land west of the Mississippi belonged to the United States. 91 At 
this moment of great contestation, fugitive slaves escaping U.S. masters catalyzed 
borderland hostilities, which further threatened the Spanish frontier. 
Spanish cédulas pertaining to the government and maintenance of the Louisiana-
Texas border region only complicated the already confused situation. Specifically, in 1789, 
King Charles IV had issued a decree that permitted the spread of slavery and yet another 
that had encouraged slave flight to Spanish territory. Simultaneously, Spain attempted to 
nurture its own agricultural economy through slave labor while offering asylum to slaves 
of foreign nations. The contradictions repeated themselves in 1803, after the Louisiana 
Purchase, when crown officials expected frontier authorities to comply with the same 
decrees.  
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Between 1803 and 1809, the territorial disputes threatening New Spain’s northern 
territories made border security a priority for the Spanish empire. Runaway bondsmen from 
Louisiana in search of Spanish refuge in Texas exacerbated the already strained 
relationship between the territories. The vulnerability of the frontier also made economic 
development nearly impossible. With these conflicting responsibilities, how did local 
officials attempt to maintain the northern frontier for Spain while concurrently harboring 
fugitive slaves of the very nations that threatened to take over their land?  
The remainder of this essay analyzes the intersections of slave asylum and border 
control in Spanish Texas. It examines Spanish treatment of fugitive slaves and other 
foreigners between 1803 and 1809. This brief period covers the first years of Louisiana 
under U.S. control, the establishment of the “Neutral Ground,” and ends just before the 
Mexican War of Independence, which redirected the attention of officials from external 
conflicts to internal turbulence.  
Within this period, frontier commandants were most concerned with the protection 
of the frontier, which meant regulating the entrance of foreigners and decreasing foreign 
presence. Officials had to demonstrate flexibility when enforcing royal orders and provided 
slaves asylum pragmatically. In total, the network of Texas officials enacted and ignored 
royal decrees for the greater purpose of securing the northern frontier.  
Post-Purchase Asylum 
In 1806, Lieutenant Colonel Simón de Herrera of New Spain and Major General 
James Wilkinson of the United States established a “neutral ground” between Texas and 
Louisiana (MAP 3). After the Louisiana Purchase, Spanish and U.S. expeditionary groups 
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explored the borderlands in search of a natural geographic division upon which both forces 
could agree. After three years, the various search parties had failed to locate a division that 
all parties could agree upon to define the limits of either territory.  
In response, Herrera and Wilkinson mapped out a large space between the Sabine 
River and the Arroyo Hondo to function as a Neutral Ground. The land between these two 
bodies of water was to serve as a buffer zone. In effect, the military officials had neutralized 
political dominion since neither political power was to exercise authority over this 
sanctioned territory until officials established and official dividing line between Texas and 
Louisiana. Nacogdoches became the frontier settlement for Texas while Natchitoches and 
Opelousas served as borderland towns for Louisiana. The Neutral Ground functioned as 
buffer zone until the ratification of the Adams-Onís Treaty in 1821.92 
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Map 3: Neutral Ground. The Neutral Ground is highlighted in yellow. The author modified an open 
access map to create this image. The original image can be found at the following we address: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sabinefreestate.png#/media/File:Sabinefreestate.png 
 
The General Commandant of the Internal Provinces, Don Nemesio Salcedo, went 
to great lengths to secure the territory for which he was responsible. In the first decade of 
the nineteenth century, his authoritative domain covered the provinces of Texas, Coahuila, 
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and Nueva Vizcaya.93 Salcedo94 held the highest level of authority in the northern territory 
answering only to the viceroy and the king. However, he often referred to the viceroy of 
New Spain on issues of utmost importance. He worked directly with the governors of Texas 
and Coahuila to ensure the integrity of the Neutral Ground. The general commandant also 
restricted placements at important posts to loyal Spaniards and any deviation from his 
orders elicited his suspicions.95 These precautions and anxieties were prudent. The new 
occupants of Louisiana were increasingly willing to disobey their superiors. 
The interests of Louisianans differed from those of the U.S. government. While 
U.S. officials were attempting end the spread of slave states, inhabitants of their new 
territory demanded slave labor. The settlers that had grown accustomed to slave labor under 
French and Spanish rule were “very much interested in obtaining an unlimited slavery.”96 
Louisianans had become extremely possessive of their bondsmen after the U.S. Congress 
attempted to weaken the role of the peculiar institution in its new territory by limiting the 
slave trade in that region. Since these slaveholders were "very much divided on…becoming 
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American Citizens” but “wonderfully alarmed lest their Slaves should be liberated,” they 
exercised a significant deal of power along the frontier.97 Their attitudes proved 
troublesome after the establishment of the Neutral Ground. The no-man’s land was a 
magnet for runaway slaves and functioned as a highway to refuge in Spanish territory.  
After 1803, asylum laws for fugitive slaves underwent greater scrutiny because 
Spanish frontier officials wished to placate their aggressive neighbors. However, as 
Louisiana slave owners made it increasingly difficult for slaves to acquire freedom legally, 
bondsmen continued to flee.98 Between 1803 and 1809, these runaway slaves encountered 
shifting asylum laws upon reaching Texas settlements. Their dangerous trek did not 
guarantee their liberty. 
Slave Asylum  
The security of New Spain’s northern frontier was contingent on the policing of 
migration to Texas. Decrees pertaining to asylum and migration, therefore, were potentially 
threatening. Anglo foreigners were attracted to the sparsely populated lands of Texas and 
threatened to overwhelm Spanish society. On the other hand, liberating fugitive slaves 
could bolster the labor force in Texas without causing internal complications. The presence 
of runaways on the frontier, however, ensured hostile relations with the territory’s slave-
owning neighbors.  
The politics of asylum enforcement reveal a strategic effort on the part of local 
Spanish officials to maintain Spain’s northernmost dominions. Governors and presidio 
                                                          
97 Ibid.; Thomas T. Davis to John Breckinridge, Oct. 17, 1803. In Hammond, “They Are Very,” 357. 
98 Cole, Shawn. “Capitalism and Freedom: Manumissions and the Slave Market in Louisiana, 1725-1820.” 
The Journal of Economic History 65, (2005): 1013. 
48 
 
commandants would grant asylum to fugitive slaves when tensions with their white masters 
did not pose a major threat to the safety of Spanish settlement. In contrast, when runaway 
slaves compromised the security of Spanish land, the same officials would readily return 
the fugitives against the mandates of their sovereign.  
Spanish policy proved inconsistent. While Texas officials had used asylum laws to 
maintain territory, in other peripheries Spanish officers had enforced them in order to 
weaken competing empires. For example, Spanish authorities in Florida had been offering 
asylum to the slaves of English colonists for the explicit purpose of weakening its frontier 
since 1693.99 King Charles II of Spain had granted “liberty to all…the men as well as 
women” who sought asylum from English slaveholders of Carolina and later Georgia. The 
incentive of freedom would lure many slaves away from the estates of their masters and, 
according to the king’s logic, “by their example and by my liberality, others will do the 
same.”100 If the fugitives converted to Catholicism upon their arrival, they acquired 
freedom by crossing the geopolitical border.  
Spanish policy to encourage runaways worked. This decree brought about one of 
the first free black settlements in the Americas, Fort Mose near St. Augustine.101 When 
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these manumission policies reached the Gulf region, Florida, and other Spanish colonies 
were already harboring large communities of self-emancipated slaves.102  
Remember that Governor Don Jacinto de Barrios y Jáuregui was the first official in 
Texas to suggest the use of asylum as a means to undermine the French settlements in 
Louisiana. He suggested that Texas offer “freedom and the protection of the king” to all 
slaves in Louisiana. At the time, Los Adaes served as the capital of the province and was 
located a mere thirteen miles west of French Natchitoches.103 Viceregal officials 
considered his proposal too risky and rejected the proposition, arguing that it would have 
invited hostility. Hence, it was not until the issuance of a decree in 1789 that this type of 
asylum policy began to affect Texas.  
The asylum cédula of 1789 originally pertained to the Caribbean, where the king 
had concurrently reopened the slave trade.104 The incident that inspired this law took place 
in 1773 when a canoe of six fugitive slaves reached the island of Trinidad. Governor Don 
Joseph Maria Chacon called upon his superiors for proper guidance and meanwhile placed 
the runaways in the homes of settlers who provided them with food and clothing.  
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Chacon’s inquiry reached the king, Charles III of Spain, who resolved that the 
governor “not return the referred Negros to those who reclaim them as their masters and 
owners.”105 The runways were to receive the Crown’s “protection and support.” In return 
for these favors, the king expected the liberated slaves to “behave like devotees, and 
grateful vassals.” For work, they would help “maintain the estates of the Hacendados.” The 
hacendados, or landowners, were to provide the new inhabitants with a “good education” 
and kind treatment; runaways “were to serve as mercenaries, and not like slaves.” A 
subsequent complication in the fulfillment of these orders led to an expansion of the decree. 
In 1783, Trinidad officials negotiated with the authorities from Grenada and agreed 
not to shelter fugitive slaves from the English island. This arrangement threatened to strip 
Teresa, a runaway slave from Grenada, of the liberty she and her five children had received 
a few years earlier. Margarita Marizo, a “free Mulata and new settler” of Trinidad, claimed 
she was Teresa’s daughter and intervened on behalf of her family; she arranged to work 
under Spanish authority until she could purchase her kin. When King Charles IV of Spain 
learned of this arrangement in 1789, he ordered his officers to reimburse Margarita for her 
labor and honor her family’s manumission.  
Charles IV reaffirmed the commitment of his predecessor to offer asylum to slaves 
and and declared that his vassals “should not restitute negros fugitivos who acquired their 
liberty for legitimate reasons.”106 The king demanded that officials across the Spanish 
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Indies offer refuge to slaves who fled harsh treatment in foreign dominions. This cédula 
reached the Louisiana-Texas region the following year.107  
Asylum Decree in Texas 
News of the asylum cédula arrived in east Texas by the summer of 1790. In the 
words of Lieutenant Manuel de Espadas of La Bahia, it forbade the “restitution of fugitive 
slaves of foreign colonies who acquire their liberty” by way of escaping into Spanish 
dominions. The official of that presidio reported that he had “published and archived” the 
order for future reference.108 Nonetheless, the archival documents suggest that Spanish 
officials did not enforce the law between Texas and Louisiana throughout the 1790s. Upon 
the decree’s declaration, both territories were under the jurisdiction of the Spanish crown. 
Thus, granting asylum to slaves from within New Spain’s jurisdiction, regardless of the 
cruelty from which they fled, was a moot point. However, once the authority of Louisiana 
changed in 1803, Spanish officials found themselves wrestling with the implementation of 
the cédula.  
In the decade preceding the Louisiana Purchase, officials of Spanish Texas had 
attempted to maintain the status quo in their dealings with the neighbor colony. 
Frontiersmen purchased slaves and goods from French-descendant neighbors covertly 
without disrupting the geopolitical stability of the region. Officials would return fugitive 
slaves to their owners on the rare occasions when the runaways migrated to Texas territory. 
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For example, when the governor of Louisiana requested the return of his settler’s runaway 
slaves, Texas Governor, Juan Bautista Elguezabal, aided in their recovery.109 After 1803, 
however, the “foreign dominions” from which slaves fled were no longer that far away. 
Commandant General Salcedo demanded strict surveillance of fugitive slaves 
entering Texas after the Louisiana Purchase. He required his subordinate offers to provide 
details on the runaways, which were to include the reasons for their flight. Stationed in 
Chihuahua, Salcedo urged his frontier officials to, “give [him] an account expressing the 
origin, name, age, and occupation” of each runaway. Officers were to use their judgment 
to make recommendations on “what should be done.”110  
Salcedo reminded them of the asylum cédula of 1789 and their commitment not to 
“surrender” fugitive slaves. However, he knew that the frontier was a dangerous place for 
the Spanish to enforce such a law. Holding on to the foreign “property” of enemies residing 
along a coterminous border was sure to provoke disputes. Angry slaveholders and land-
hungry settlers would follow runaways into Texas.  
Indeed, the loss of Louisiana brought about additional concerns regarding 
migration along the frontier. On November 9, 1803, General Commandant Salcedo only 
allowed Spanish vassals residing in Louisiana to return to New Spain’s Interior Provinces 
(Include third map?). However, Salcedo stressed the need to follow his orders exactly. He 
wanted the officials at Nacogdoches to evaluate the returnees meticulously and only allow 
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those with borderlands experience to remain in Texas. The local authorities were to send 
all others to the interior, where there was a great demand for labor.  
During this period, as part of the Bourbon Reforms, Spanish officials hoped to make 
the Interior Provinces profitable. For that, the territory required laborers. In 1804, Charles 
IV encouraged the Interior Provinces to engage in his renewed liberal policies regarding 
the slave trade. The king hoped to widen the market for human chattel after having 
expanded the Caribbean slave trade in 1789, 1791, and again in 1804.111 He saw it fit to 
“extend this to the Provincias Internas.”112 To stimulate the agricultural development, the 
crown also broadened tax relief on cotton, tithes, and coffee.  
Thus, by 1805, Spanish officials of the Interior Provinces were responsible for 
observing several conflicting royal orders. On one hand, the crown expected them to make 
the Internal Provinces economically productive through agriculture. However, the viceroy 
limited their ability to populate the region by restricting the migration of foreigners.  
The monarch also expected his administrative authorities to secure the northern 
territories and grant liberty to the fugitive slaves of foreign nations. Yet providing 
runaways with asylum weakened the security of the frontier given the aggressive character 
of the Louisiana slave-owners who threatened to harass borderland settlements. Thus, to 
honor their king’s wishes, local officials had to prioritize mandates. Keeping U.S. 
Americans out of their territory became their first concern.  
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Administering Asylum Strategically 
Anglo-Americans jeopardized the territorial integrity of the Interior Provinces 
before the establishment of the Neutral Ground. With the exact boundaries of Louisiana 
unsettled, several adventurers and U.S. sponsored researchers reconnoitered and explored 
the furthest reaches of what they considered their territory. By January of 1805, 
Commandants from New Mexico, Texas, and Missouri had warned General Commandant 
Salcedo and Viceroy José de Iturrigaray of these intrusions. Zebulon Montgomery Pike, 
Meriwether Lewis, and William Clark were among these trespassers.  
According to local officials, these outsiders were trading with their Native 
American allies and replacing Spanish symbols of loyalty with Anglo-American gifts.113 
Spanish officials needed to impede these invaders before they ruined New Spain’s already 
precarious ties with the natives and settled more land that did not pertain to Louisiana. If 
foreigners could cross over into Spanish dominions, they would be better poised to claim 
more of New Spain’s territory. However, Anglo intruders were not the only individuals 
crossing Louisianan boundaries. U.S. control strengthened the rights of slaveholders 
making it imperative for freedom-seeking bondsmen to flee. Their movement continued to 
compromise Spanish control of Texas borderlands.  
Runaway slaves fled to Texas in the first years following the land transfer between 
1803 and 1809. In 1804, the U.S. Governor of Louisiana, William C. C. Claiborne, sent 
Marqués de Casa Calvo, the Spanish Commissioner and official overseeing the transfer of 
                                                          
113 Memorandum, Nemesio Salcedo to Viceroy Jose Iturrigaray,  Chihuahua, January 23, 1805; AGN, 
Provincias Internas, Volume 200, exp. 3, fs. 308. 
55 
 
Louisiana, several numerous complaints from Louisiana settlers demanding the return of 
their slave property. This resulted in Casa Calvo requesting that Spanish officials in Texas 
suspend the Slave Asylum law of 1789.114 If runaways angered U.S. settlers, the marques 
preferred that slaves return to bondage. Since Casa Calvo thought the issue deserved 
serious attention, he was willing to compromise the reputation of a fellow officer.  
Casa Calvo acknowledged that the Anglo-Americans had directed their grievances 
at the Commandant José Joaquin Ugarte. “The insubordination of the Negros at 
Natchitoches,” claimed Governor Claiborne “was produced by having been offered liberty 
and complete protection by the Commandant of Nacogdoches.”115 Allegedly, the frontier-
post commander had publically announced the asylum decrees in Louisiana territory. Casa 
Calvo begged the officials in Texas to address this wrong. Given the “retrocession of 
Louisiana,” the Marqués reasoned, the asylum laws “demand a modification or new 
declaration from the Sovereign.” He understood that, during the transitional period, the 
decisions of local officials to accept or return runaway slaves had the potential to ruin New 
Spain’s efforts in securing its frontier. 
The Anglo-Americans’ anger, incited by their loss of slaves, threatened to disrupt 
the official attempts to determine the actual limits between the two territories. Several 
mapping excursions were to embark by the summer of 1805. The results of this geographic 
research would inform officials of the “natural” divisions between Texas and Louisiana. 
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Considering the possible biases of U.S. cartographers, it behooved Spanish officials to map 
the territory first. Casa Calvo was fully cognizant of the delicate situation and had 
scheduled an expedition of his own for July. Hence, he exercised his geopolitical muscles 
from Louisiana and insisted on an annulment of the cédula concerning runaway slaves. To 
insure amicable negotiations of the new Spanish frontier, Casa Calvo aimed to appease his 
Louisianan hosts. 
Casa Calvo wanted to ameliorate the tensions with American slave owners. He 
believed it dangerous to continue the using the asylum law of 1789. He attempted to cool 
the hostile environment by thwarting the outflow of slaves. In his appeal to Spanish 
officials, he emphasized the dissension of the Natchitoches slaves, stating that they “seem 
determined to subvert the necessary obedience to their masters.” Slaves in Port Contada, 
“one of the richest and most powerful in lower Louisiana,” were also rife with the 
“contagion of insubordination.”116  
The marques urged local officials in Spanish Texas to “take the most efficacious 
measures possible” to stop the fugitive slaves. By this, he meant for them to issue “orders 
forbidding the granting of asylum to any Negro or mulatto slave that may present himself 
as a runaway from Louisiana.”117 These preventative actions were, at least, a “precaution 
to not offend” slaveholders. He reasoned that restricting the entrance of fugitive slaves 
would make the frontier more secure for New Spain.  
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As his recommendations suggest, Casa Calvo thought the situation with the 
Americans warranted local action before royal decision; he wanted his fellow officials to 
act first, and honor royal decrees second. In his requests to the General Commandant 
Salcedo, he requested that any fugitive slave “that may be found in Nacogdoches or other 
frontier post” in Texas be returned “to Natchitoches or Atakapa.”118 He knew these actions 
violated the royal orders but this minor infringement, he believed, was best “until the 
decision of his Majesty can be received.”119 Preparing himself for an exploration of the 
region to determine the boundary, one can understand his uneasiness and desire to avoid 
conflict with the Americans. Nonetheless, his preference to appeal to the interests of U.S. 
citizens earned him the skepticism of the viceroy.  
Viceroy Iturrigaray found the recommendations of Casa Calvo unnecessary and 
divisive. He rejected the proposition to return the runaway slaves and dismissed his claim 
that U.S. settlers were hostile towards Commandant Ugarte. Responding to the marques, 
Iturrigaray cited a letter Natchitoches inhabitants had written to praise the work of Ugarte. 
This note celebrated the friendly relationship between Nacogdoches and Natchitoches and 
portrayed a harmonious frontier. Although Claiborne had accused Ugarte of inspiring 
insubordination, five Louisianan inhabitants praised him for “suppressing the spirit of 
insurrection” and requested that the commandant “accept [their] homage of gratitude.”120 
While their zealous report may ring suspect—perhaps Ugarte was working too hard to 
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make them happy—Iturrigaray determined that the situation with insubordinate slaves 
along the frontier was better than Casa Calvo depicted. 
Despite his rejection of the recommendations for restitution, the viceroy of New 
Spain did not want to encourage slave flight and thus, exhibited his own willingness to 
circumvent the royal decree. Iturrigaray asserted an adaptable approach to asylum law 
enforcement. Instead of offering liberty to slaves, as the original decree prescribed, 
Iturrigaray declared that; “all slaves from Louisiana that present themselves in Texas 
should be detained until a resolution from the Majesty.”121  
Iturrigaray’s actions suggest that most Spanish officials hoped to negotiate peaceful 
relations with the Louisianans. The officers on the frontier, especially, prioritized their 
duties and interpreted laws flexibly to secure the territory. This was common in northern 
New Spain where lawyers were rare, leaving the military authorities to enforce laws 
pragmatically.122 Indeed, the turnover of officials led to further revisions to asylum decrees. 
Fugitives, Foreigners, and Production  
In Texas, several administrative changes took place between 1804 and 1806—the 
year Herrera and Wilkinson established the Neutral Ground. José Joaquin Ugarte of 
Nacogdoches transferred to San Antonio de Bexar to serve as commandant. Dionisio Valle, 
a soldier from Bexar, replaced Ugarte at the frontier post. After the death of Governor 
Elguezabal, Manuel Antonio Cordero y Bustamante became the chief magistrate of Texas 
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in 1805. Furthermore, Commandant General Nemesio Salcedo upheld Iturrigaray’s 
decision to detain but not grant freedom to fugitive slaves.123 Texas officials reasoned that 
the altered protocol did “not oppose the prevention” of returning “black fugitive slaves 
from Louisiana.”124 Slaves could still find refuge in Spanish dominions, but they would 
face limited liberties. 
Sheltering runaway slaves without bestowing freedom spurred the economic 
development of the Interior Province. Commandant General Salcedo prescribed a living 
arrangement for fugitive slaves akin to indentured servitude, reminiscent of the protocol 
Trinidad officials had enacted decades earlier. Salcedo’s orders for the “black slaves that 
present themselves in those dominions of our majesty” called for the runaways to be 
“detained and maintained by their own work.” Officials were to assign each fugitive slave 
a place of residence in the home of a local official or settler. The refugee would assist his 
or her host with their trade and earn their keep. Frontier settlements could not afford idle 
bodies. 
Living in East Texas was difficult since it had limited trade options and lacked a 
large labor force to cultivate staple goods.125 The Bourbon demands for agricultural 
production placed the Interior Provinces in a dilemma: increase the labor force but limit 
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immigrants. Most settlers in Texas were destitute, since wealthy landowners had little 
interest in moving to New Spain’s periphery. Although the royal decrees encouraged the 
slave trade in the territory, little chattel reached Texas. The Spanish settlers were too few 
and too poor to accumulate a large number of bondsmen.126  
As an alternative, Anglo foreigners provided additional able-bodied workers. 
However, the executive authorities considered their presence in the frontier dangerous and 
therefore unacceptable. Conversely, frontier officials understood the utility of foreign 
laborers and employed the illegal migrants without their superior’s permission.  
Nemesio Salcedo had increased his suspicions of foreigners entering Texas after 
the Louisiana Purchase. He feared that a large number of Anglo settlers in the Interior 
Provinces could usurp even more Spanish-claimed territory. In 1804, he wrote to Texas 
officials ordering that they “impede the introduction…of Anglo-American individuals.”127 
To keep track of the Anglo individuals already settled along New Spain’s frontier, the 
General Commandant asked officials to create detailed census reports of all foreigners 
living in Nacogdoches.  
Again, frontier officials sometimes practiced leniency when enforcing migration 
orders. For example, when they made records of non-Spanish settlers, they noted that two 
foreigners, Juan and Pallar, had been living in Nacogdoches for less than a year. Salcedo 
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reprimanded his subordinates for allowing these men to settle there after 1803. This was 
“contrary to the orders communicated on this issue,” he complained.128 
However, negotiation between authorities in the Interior Provinces over how to 
proceed in these situations seemed to have occurred. Nemesio Salcedo agreed that some 
foreigners should stay in Nacogdoches to collect the crop that they had helped plant. He 
understood that returnees and American deserters could bring lucrative skills to New 
Spain’s northern periphery.129 However, he demanded that officials send them back to their 
proper territories after they harvested that crop.130 Salcedo did not want the Anglo 
population in Spanish territory to grow.131  
By 1807, Salcedo felt uncomfortable with the number of illegal immigrants that 
had slipped through the Louisiana-Texas boundary. He demanded that frontier officials 
remove “foreigners who have been living in that district [Nacogdoches] after the transfer 
of Louisiana…from the interior provinces.”132  The decree suggests that some of the 
intruders had a tendency to lie about their intentions. It specified differences between 
“those who pretend to move and those without this outlook.”133 The local authorities were 
to judge accordingly and send some of these aliens to the capital for questioning. Others, 
they were to push back across the boundary. The decree allowed for some flexibility if 
marriage had complicated this arrangement, but overall, trespassers were unwelcomed. 
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Such provisions against the entrance of foreigners left open the question of the treatment 
of fugitive slaves. 
The authorities of borderland posts were unsure of how to categorize the runaway 
slaves: were they foreigners or potential inhabitants? The decree to remove all immigrants 
had catalyzed these anxieties. Indeed, some frontier officials may have attempted to send 
fugitive slaves back to their former masters since Commandant General Salcedo promptly 
clarified his orders. Referring to his previous expulsion decree, he wrote that the harbored 
bondsmen were “not understood and cannot be understood to mean” unwanted intruders.134 
Foreigners were unwelcome in Spanish Texas while fugitive slaves were likely to find 
refuge there. Frontier settlements could continue sheltering the runaways and allow them 
to subsist by their own labor. 
Spanish authorities considered fugitive slaves as acceptable migrants who could 
help agricultural production. Frontier officials thus reckoned the value of the runaways in 
terms of their ability to produce. Yet, those that reached the Spanish dominions were not 
always in a healthy state. They sometimes arrived injured, impaired, or otherwise unable 
to work. Salcedo acknowledged these discrepancies, cautioning that “the poor quality of 
the said negroes,” might lead to a lack “of individuals willing to employ the [fugitive 
slaves].”135  
When local authorities could not find useful jobs for the detained runaways “or in 
any of the places where there were detachments,” they were to make the refugees occupy 
                                                          
134 Nemesio Salcedo to Governor Cordero Chihuahua, Febuary 9, 1807; BA: mf. 35:630-636. 
135 Nemesio Salcedo to Governor Cordero Chihuahua, August 14, 1806; BA: mf. 34:947-954.   
63 
 
themselves with “the work on the field.”136 As this decree stated, this should continue “until 
a new resolution” directed otherwise. 137 The calculus of asylum was ongoing and tricky 
since it intersected with the filtering out of foreigners.   
Refugee slaves could only work for Spanish vassals. A frontiersman who wanted 
to host a runaway and therefore benefit from his/her labor must have “had the necessary 
licenses to establish themselves in that province.” 138 This clarification suggests that loyal, 
but non-Spanish settlers must have also solicited for the labor of detained bondsmen. The 
need for labor across the frontier created an environment in which runaway slaves, though 
limited in their freedoms, had more economic opportunities than other foreigners. These 
labor preferences did not necessarily mean that Spain encouraged abolition or complete 
emancipation. On the contrary, the Crown punished attempts promote it.  
The Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) had threatened all slave-owning societies in 
the Atlantic. Conspiring Spanish emissaries heightened the alarm along the Gulf Coast. 
Apparently, two such couriers had been inciting the revolutionary slave movement in Santo 
Domingo and, in 1807, were traveling towards for the coastal provinces of New Spain. 
General Commandant Salcedo relayed this information to Governor Cordero, warning him 
that at least two men headed for the Interior Provinces and traveled “with the object of 
organizing a slave revolution in American establishments.”139  
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Salcedo, after recently clarifying that those fugitive slaves seeking liberty should 
receive asylum, drew a hard line on slave rebellion. He wanted “all men of every color, 
when they arrive from Santo Domingo to the Colonies of Spain…immediately arrested.” 
140 Spanish officials could not allow any revolutionary-leaning individuals to start slave 
rebellions in the northern territory. Such rabble-rousers would weaken the empire’s 
objective to increase slavery in some of the colonies. Moreover, slave uprisings would 
upset the tenuous ties the frontier maintained with the United States.  
American Frustrations 
U.S. frontiersmen became more and more aggrieved as their slaves continued to 
find asylum in Texas. Finally, on September 5, 1807, two Natchitoches slave owners wrote 
out their angst and petitioned Spanish frontier officials to return their runaway slaves. They 
addressed their complaint to Governor Cordero. Their petition began by confirming their 
confidence “in the justice and good faith of the Spanish government.” They stated that, 
having “been a long time silent…on an oppressive affliction that [they] hoped would be 
reformed… [they had] witnessed the opposite.”141 The request declared that the men were 
“informed that the pretext for [our slaves’] detention in your territories is a directive from 
your Spanish Catholic Majesty, who promises them protection.” U.S. government, to their 
knowledge, had not agreed to this law in any treaty.  
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The Americans reminded the Spaniards of Article 20 in the U.S.-Spanish treaty of 
1795, which stated that inhabitants of both territories were eligible to petition for justice in 
the tribunals of the other. Included in these liberties was the permission “to pursue litigation 
for the collection of their properties.” Under this right, they argued, they could demand the 
return of their slaves. Moreover, they requested a passport to travel to San Antonio to 
address their complaint to Don Cordero and present what they believed to be a “great 
violation” against them.142 When the governor received the inquiry, he was unsure of how 
to respond. The Americans sought legal recourse, not to invade Texas like troublemaking 
filibusters but to retrieve their slaves as property owners. Cordero turned to his authority, 
the commandant general.  
Nemesio Salcedo remained committed to the asylum decrees. He concluded that he 
could not “without violence, apply to this case Article 20 of the October 27, 1795 treaty.”143 
He reasoned that “the contract for the recovery of property, payment of debt, and the 
satisfaction of damages,” that the Americans sought, did not fall under “any class of 
asylum.” The harbored slaves, however, had fled due to “the cruelty with which they were 
treated by their masters.”144 Returning these individuals would be inhumane if only “for 
the severe fear [they] have for their return, a fear that they are justified in having.”145 Hence, 
Salcedo refused to release the refugees. The commandant generals’ decisiveness, however, 
did not mean Spanish officials were unwilling to negotiate.  
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Upon General Commandant’s rejection of the Natchitoches petitions, Governor 
Claiborne of Louisiana discussed the possibility of a slave exchange with U.S. Secretary 
of State, James Madison. The Americans took their proposition to the Spanish diplomat in 
Philadelphia, Don Valentin de Foronda who suggested a key modification in the original 
plans. Since Texas settlers owned few slaves, any slave swap between the U.S. and Spain 
would have to include Florida: fugitive slaves in Texas in exchange for fugitive slaves in 
Georgia.146 As the U.S. and Spanish representatives considered a possible exchange, the 
inhabitants of Louisiana grew restless.   
While officials attempted to agree on conditions for a swap, U.S. Natchitoches 
slaveholders festered in their frustration. One slave master had lost up to eighteen slaves 
alone. Vexed by formalities, these men schemed to reclaim their slaves on their own 
terms.147 However, many individuals avoided direct invasion of Texas after the 
establishment of the Neutral Ground. Salcedo had previously threatened that “the instant 
any hostile move is made by the United States, Your Lordship shall publish a 
proclamation…declaring that any Negro slave who takes refuge in Spanish territory will 
be given his freedom.”148  
Instead, some desperate slave owners collaborated with Native American allies to 
capture their chattel. For example, on April 14, 1808 three slaves reached Nacogdoches 
and informed their hosts that their masters had paid Indians to enter Texas and look for 
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them. The frontier settlements could not withstand any more Indian hostility. Once again, 
the insecure social climate of the frontier caused Spanish officials to reconsider the asylum 
protocol.  
 Governor Cordero ordered his frontier commandants to send all fugitive slaves to 
the newly established Villa of Salcedo, also known as Trinidad de Salcedo. He had 
designed that settlement along the Trinity River to protect frontier settlers from Indian 
attacks.149 The governor reasoned that the refugee slaves would experience greater security 
there. More importantly, perhaps, they would provoke fewer threats along the border. Their 
relocation would hinder “Indians who could be tempted by bribes from the United 
States.”150 While the governor of Texas responded to the new threats on his own accord, 
the commandant general Salcedo maintained different priorities. 
For Nemesio Salcedo, the economy of the Interior Provinces was of considerable 
concern. Upon approving Cordero’s executive actions to relocate fugitive slaves to Villa 
de Salcedo, he insisted that Texas officials advise the Villa de Salcedo authorities to make 
sure that the fugitives worked for their own subsistence. The new post—located between 
Nacogdoches and San Antonio—could not afford any freeloaders. Salcedo gave Cordero a 
warning: “if one of [the fugitive slaves] does not find an occupation for which he can 
subsist,” the official at Villa de Salcedo was permitted “to return [them] to your villa.”151 
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Nemesio was not willing to exacerbate the grim conditions of frontier settlements for the 
sake of fugitive slave security. 
For Don Nemesio, maintaining the interior provinces for Spain was the key priority. 
He did his best to provide asylum for fugitive slaves, and even acquiesced when they were 
inconvenient guests. However, his first loyalties were always to Spain and its interests. 
Thus, by the end of 1808, Nemesio Salcedo ordered that frontier officials transfer all 
fugitive slaves to the frontier and prepare for a possible trade.  
Before the Revolutionary Strike 
Shortly after Napoleon Bonaparte removed King Charles IV from the Spanish 
throne, Texas experienced subversive unrest, which prompted additional changes to the 
asylum policies. The threat of revolution in the motherland made Spanish authorities more 
cautious of their interactions with Louisianans; they could not allow rebels and filibusters 
to unite forces against Spain’s authority in Texas. To derail such a possibility, the several 
frontier commanders had thought it best to appease their neighbors.  
On occasion, Texas officials had agreed to “return the fugitive slaves to the stated 
province of Louisiana from which they were reclaimed.”152 General Commandant Salcedo 
acknowledged these sporadic (and illegal) exchanges. His nephew, the new Governor of 
Texas, Manuel de Salcedo, was among those who returned runaways illicitly.  
However, Don Nemesio Salcedo acted with more caution and tact than his 
subordinates. He reminded his nephew, and the other frontier commanders, that orders had 
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not changed: slaves were to remain in Spanish territory. However, he ordered frontier 
officials to treat “the American individuals who present themselves requesting the 
solicitation of Negros” with “caution not to offend them.” 153 He echoed the language used 
in U.S. American petitions, reasoning that their demands for slaves were “their right as 
men.”  
Commandant General Salcedo also wished for frontier officials to defer to superior 
authorities for matters concerning slave asylum. He ordered subordinate officers not to 
“contact American officials on this point, as other issues may arise because of 
miscommunication.”154 If “urgent and executive cases…occur,” he qualified, “refer to 
"Senor Cordero.”155 Poor exchanges at the frontier level could disrupt the politicking of the 
Spanish diplomats who had yet to determine the status of a frontier slave exchange. 
Nevertheless, Don Nemesio wanted the frontier commanders to gather the fugitive slaves 
and prepare for a possible runaway swap.  
Governor Manuel Salcedo prepared for the pending trade. He sent word to Pedro 
Lopez Prieto, Commandant of Trinidad de Salcedo, to “gather together…all of the fugitive 
slaves of the various inhabitants of Natchitoches and others of Louisiana that have sought 
refuge in this province.” 156 The frontier commanders were to “escort and guard [harbored 
slaves] to Nacogdoches” in anticipation of an exchange. He ensured Commandant Prieto 
that these transfers did not necessarily mean a trade would occur. Nor did they 
                                                          
153 Nemesio Salcedo to Governor Cordero, Chihuahua, November 29, 1808; BA: mf. 39: 39:588-591.  
154 Ibid. 
155Ibid. 
156 Governor Manuel Salcedo to Commandant Pedro Lopez Prieto, Bexar, December 16, 1808; BA: mf. 
39:698.  
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automatically result in the slaves returning to their former masters. However, after years of 
refusing to return runaway slaves, frontier authorities prepared to end their offer of asylum. 
Fortunately, for the runaways, neither Spanish nor U.S. officials could agree on 
satisfactory terms for the exchange. By August of 1809, Salcedo asked frontier officials to 
“receive and protect [the fugitive slaves] like it was before ordered.” The commandant 
general, on this occasion, did not have to bend the 1789 royal decree for asylum. Governor 
Manuel Salcedo interpreted this in his dispatch to frontier commandants: the “black slaves 
of Louisiana and of any other foreign colonies…justifiably fled to acquire his liberty.”157 
Spanish authorities would honor that objective. 
  
                                                          
157Governor Manuel Salcedo to Commandant Pedro Lopez Prieto, Bexar, December 16, 1808; BA: mf. 
39:698. 
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Conclusion  
 
Between 1714 and 1809, migrants played a large role in determining the limits of 
New Spain’s northern periphery. The formal and informal location of political boundaries 
was contingent on a local actor’s exposure to and memory of the movement of illicit border 
crossers. Their various perspectives also shaped the social and legal terrain in the Gulf 
Coast. As the accounts of Adaesaños indicate, frontiersmen reflected on the ways in which 
individuals had transgressed popularly understood imperial divisions and used that 
information to construct their perceptions of the colonial border. Whether or not Spanish 
officials used their opinions to resolve boundary disputes, the collection of frontier 
knowledge confirms that borderland inhabitants participated in shaping frontiers and they 
relied on border crossers to do so.  
The frequent movement of individuals, legal and illegal—authorized or illicit—
reinforced the way frontiersmen spatially imagined or understood sovereignty, liberty, and 
opportunity. Unhappy soldiers and miserable slaves thought about New Spain’s 
borderlands as an emancipatory space. In second half of the eighteenth century, deserting 
soldiers found alternative employment and new life in Los Adaes. Others found themselves 
imprisoned or in Mexico City. Runaway slaves met similar conditions. Some experienced 
freedom from enslavement and found accommodations in the estates of Spanish settlers. 
Others returned to their masters in Louisiana. Despite the various outcome of border 
crossings and the constantly changing conditions of liberty in Texas, individuals continued 
to think about and treat the Spanish borderlands as a region of liberation throughout the 
colonial period. Their actions to this end challenged the process of establishing firm 
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political lines. The true border then, in accordance with its many wayfarers, was never 
static. The dividing line between Texas and Louisiana was dependent on who attempted to 
draw it. 
The northeastern frontier of New Spain’s borderland began with the spotty 
settlement of Texas. French colonization catalyzed the formulations of specific, yet 
negotiable, delimitations. These dividing lines bounded power but also served as revolving 
doors for individuals in transit. The Louisiana Purchase signaled a loss in New Spain’s 
ability to remain indifferent to its ill-defined boundaries. U.S. Americans vying for more 
territory, runaway slaves trespassing political borders, and Native Americans negotiating 
terms of Euro-American settlement, also led frontier officials to seek greater control and 
define borders more distinctly.  
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Epilogue: Post 1809 
Louisiana-Texas borderland conflict concerning the asylum decree of 1789 receded 
after the negotiations for a fugitive slave exchange failed. Official correspondence 
concerning the issue nearly disappeared after 1809. The Grito de Dolores of 1810 that 
initiated the Mexican independence movement shifted all attention to internal discontent. 
As some Texas officials complained, Texas was defenseless against internal insurgents.158 
Filibuster expeditions composed of Tejanos and Anglo-Americans threatened to accelerate 
the revolutionary process to liberate Texas. As the independence movement moved 
towards Texas, frontier officials left the issues on slave asylum unresolved.  
Between 1803 and 1809, frontier commanders were flexible with their enforcement 
of asylum decrees since they affected frontier settlements directly. On occasion, they 
covertly collaborated with U.S. officials in Louisiana to return runaway slaves. Superior 
Spanish authorities such as the governors, general commandants, and viceroys, advised 
against such actions but also demonstrated a willingness to negotiate law enforcement for 
the sake of border control and territorial security. Fugitive slaves played an active role in 
this international discourse by resisting slavery and seeking asylum. Without their 
resistance, the boundary between Texas and Louisiana may have looked different today. 
Runaway bondsmen sought refuge from bondage in Spanish territories until Mexico gained 
its independence in 1821. They continued to pursue liberty in Spanish America even after 
the border distinguishing Mexico from the United State became more distinct. Slaves 
                                                          
158 Governor Manuel Salcedo to Nemesio Salcedo, Bexar, November 21, 1810;; BA: mf 47:315. 
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escaped to Mexico until the Civil War ended the peculiar institution.159 Even after 
abolition, individuals continued to transcend this political division in search of opportunity.  
Further exploration of Spanish border control and its significance on an imperial, 
regional, and local level requires more investigation and additional questions: How did the 
frontier experiences of groups not explored in this report shape the method of colonial 
border control and its effectiveness? Given the expansive character of the border, why 
would a border crosser choose to present themselves to Spanish officials? What were the 
alternatives? What does this reveal about the historical role immigrants have had in shaping 
this particular borderland and how did it influence the construction of future ones?  
 
 
  
                                                          
159 Kelley, Sean. “‘Mexico in His Head’: Slavery and the Texas-Mexico Border, 1810-1860.” Journal of 
Social History 37, no. 3 (April 1, 2004): 709–23. 
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